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Abstract 
The energy efJciency requirement of wireless sensor net- 
works (WSNs) is especially high because the sensor nodes 
are meant to operate without human intervention for a long 
period of time with little energy supply. Besides, available 
storage is scarce due to their small physical size. There- 
fore choosing the most storage- and energy-eflcient block 
cipher for WSNs is important. However to our knowledge 
so far; no systematic work has been conducted in this area. 
In this p a p s  we have identified the candidates of block ci- 
phers suitable for WSNs based on existing literature and au- 
thoritative recommendations. We have benchmarked these 
candidates and based on this benchmark, we have selected 
the suitable ciphers for WSNs, namely Rijndael for high se- 
curity and energy efficiency requirements; but MISTY1 for 
good storage and energy efJciency. In terms of operation 
mode, we recommend Output Feedback Mode for static net- 
works, but Counter Mode for dynamic networks. 
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1. Introduction 
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a network com- 
posed of a large number of sensors that (1) are physically 
small, (2) communicate wirelessly among each other, and 
( 3 )  are deployed without prior knowledge of the network 
topology. Due to the limitation of their physical size, the 
sensors tend to have storage space, energy supply and com- 
munication bandwidth so limited that every possible means 
of reducing the usage of these resources is aggressively 
sought. For example, a sensor typically has 8-120KB of 
code memory and 5 12-4096 bytes of data memory. The en- 
ergy supply of a sensor is such that it will he depleted in less 
than 3 days if operated constantly in active mode [18].  The 
transmission bandwidth ranges from IOkbps to 11Skbps. 
Table 1 compares the sensor node used in the EYES project 
(eyes .eu.org) with Smart Dust [I21 and the Intel Re- 
search mote [IS]. 
Karlof and Wagner made an interesting observation that 
Table 1. ComDarison of the EYES node with 
WSNs will more likely ride Moore’s Law downward [14], 
that is, instead of relying on the computing power to dou- 
ble every I8 months, we are hound to seek ever cheaper 
solutions. However looking at the current development of 
WSNs (Table I), computing power is indeed increasing, 
though not necessarily at the rate predicted by Moore’s Law. 
Either way, we are conservative and assume that the hard- 
ware constraints of WSNs will remain rather constant for 
some time io come. 
Cryptographic algorithms are an essential part of the se- 
curity architecture of WSNs, using the most efficient ‘and 
sufficiently secure algorithm is thus an effective means of 
conserving resources. By ‘efficient’ in this paper we mean 
requiring little storage and consuming little energy. Al- 
though transmission consumes more energy than computa- 
tion, our focus in this paper is on computation and we can 
only take transmission energy into account when consid- 
ering the security scheme as a whole. The essential cryp- 
tographic primitives for WSNs are block ciphers, message 
authentication codes (MACs) and hash functions. Among 
these primitives, we are only concerned with block ciphers 
in this paper, because MACs can be constructed from block 
ciphers [25], and hash functions are relatively cheap [6]. 
Meanwhile, public-key algorithms are well-known to he 
prohibitively expensive [4]. 
Our selection of block ciphers is RC5 [26], RC6 [27], 
Rijndael [8], MISTY1 [IY], KASUMI [ I ]  and Camel- 
lia [31. Although Rijndael has been selected by the Ameri- 
can National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), after a five- 
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year long standardisation process that included extensive 
benchmarking on a variety of platforms ranging from smart 
cards [ 1 I ]  to high end parallel machines [32], the selection 
of Rijndael for our platform is not obvious. This is because 
the fact that Rijndael is on average the best performer on 
a range of standard platforms, does not mean that it also 
performs best on our platform, which is Texas Instruments’ 
16-bit RISC-based MSP430F149 1301, chosen for its ultra- 
low power consumption (www . ti . com). During the selec- 
tion process of the A E S ,  the focus has been on 8-bit smart 
cards, 32-bit mainstream architectures and 64-bit high-end 
platforms, but not 16-bit architectures, further highlighting 
the importance of our study. 
The contribution of this paper is two-fold: ( I )  to measure 
the candidates of block ciphers suitable for WSNs, and (2) 
to select the suitable ciphers based on the benchmark. 
Section 2 explains 
bow we have arrived at our selection of block ciphers. Sec- 
tion 3 details aspects of our benchmarking. Section 4 pro- 
vides our observation and evaluation results. Section 5 con- 
cludes. 
The paper is organised as follows. 
2. Selection Rationales 
We have chosen our benchmark candidates based on the 
following rationales: 
RC5 is a well-known algorithm that bas been around 
since 1995 without crippling weaknesses. Although 
distributed.net has managed to crack a @-bit RC5 
key in RSA Laboratories Secret-Key Challenge after 1757 
days of computing involving 58,747,597,657 distributed 
work units, the standard key length of RCS is 128 bits and 
RC5 has managed to withstand years o f  cryptanalysis. 
RC6, like RCS, is parameterised and has a small code 
size. RC6 is one of the five finalists that competed in the 
A E S  challenge and according to some AES evaluation re- 
ports [22][32], it has reasonable performance. Lastly, RC6 
has been chosen as the algorithm of choice by Slijepcevic 
et al. [291 for WSNs. We are interested in seeing if their 
choice is justified. 
Rijndael is the de facto Advanced Encryption Stan- 
dard, mandated by the NIST of the United States, cho- 
sen after extensive scrutiny and performance evaluation 
(csrc .nist .gov/encryption/aes). It is also one 
of the ciphers recommended by the New European Schemes 
for Signature, Integrity and Encryption (NESSIE) Consor- 
tium (www.cryptonessie.org), and Japan’s CRYP- 
TREC [7]. Rijndael is well studied and there are effi- 
cient implementations on a wide range of platforms (www. 
rijndael .coin). We would however like to obtain first- 
hand experience of evaluating Rijndael on our particular 
platform, which has never been studied before during the 
selection process of the AES. 
MISTYl is one of the CRYPTKEC-recommended 64- 
hit ciphers [7] and is the predecessor of  KASUMI, the 
3GPP-endorsed encryption algorithm [l]. MISTY 1 is also 
a royalty-free open standard documented in RFC2994 [23]. 
We found MISTYl to be particularly suitable for 16-bit 
platforms. 
KASUMI, as the 3GPP-endorsed encryption algo- 
rithm [I], is presumably well-suited for embedded appli- 
cations, and has gone through considerable expert scrutiny. 
Camellia is one of the NESSIE- and CRYPTREC- 
recommended 128-hit ciphers [7]. Like MISTY I ,  Camellia 
is also royalty-free. Security-wise, Camellia has been de- 
signed with state-of-the-art modem techniques with a large 
safety margin in view of anticipated progress in cryptanal- 
ysis techniques [21[20]. We are interested in seeing how it 
performs on our platform. 
3. Methodology and Consideration 
For benchmarking, we consider: (1) the cipher param- 
eters, (2) the cipher operation modes, (3) the compiler 
toolchain, and (4) the implementation sources. 
3.1. Cipher Parameters 
Table 2 lists the parameters w e  have adopted for each 
cipher (some of them actually have fixed, unadjustable pa- 
rameters but we list them anyway for clarity’s sake). The 
number of rounds for each cipher is nominal except for 
RCS, where 18 is used instead of the nominal 16, for secu- 
rity reasons described in our technical report [ 171. Although 
RC5 and KC6 allow variable word size, without the back- 
ing of relevant cryptanalytic research, we are not sure how 
many rounds to use if we pick a non-standard word size of 
16 bits, which is the word size of our platform. Therefore, 
for RCS and RC6, we are using the standard word size of 
32 bits. 
Table 2. Cipher parameters (lengths in bytes). 
1 Cipher I Key length Rounds Block Exmnded I . .  
length ke; length 
RC5 I 16 18 8 152 
I RC6 I 16 20 16 176 I 
64 
128 
Rijndael 16 10 16 1 MISTY1 1 16 8 8 
KASUMI 16 8 8 I Camellia I 16 18 16 272 
3.2. Operation Modes 
The naYve approach of encrypting a message longer than 
one block, by dividing the message into multiple blocks 
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and encrypting the blocks separately, is called the electronic 
codebook mode (ECB) mode. ECB is insecure since an ad- 
versary can constmct valid ciphertexts from the original ci- 
phertext by arbitrarily rearranging, repeating andor omit- 
ting blocks from the original ciphertext. More secure op- 
eration modes in Table 3 are used in practice. These op- 
eration modes do not only affect the security, but also the 
energy-efficiency of the encryption scheme. Their fault tol- 
erance against ciphertext error (where Ciphertext bits are 
changed during transmission), and synchronisation error 
(where whole ciphertext blocks are lost) must also be taken 
into account. In our implementation of CBC, ciphertext 
stealing [28] is supported, so padding is not required. Mean- 
while, some researchers [16] claim that CBC has an infor- 
mation leakage vulnerability due to the birthday paradox. 
For CFB and OFB, we are using a feedback size that is equal 
to the block size. 
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Table 3. 
Operation 
mode 
Cipher-Block 
Chaining 
(CBC) 
Cipher Feed- 
hack Mode 
(CFW 
Output Feed- 
back Made 
(OFB) 
Counter (CTR) 
. . .. .. 
all cipher operation modes. 
(2) It is well-suited for 
benchmarking. 
( I )  Supports most if not Although it does imple- 
a11 cipher operation modes. ment some non-standard 
(2) It is well-suited for modem ciphers (e.g. 
benchmarking. (3) Com- RC6). it does not imple- 
pared with Crypto++ and ment many othen (e.g. 
it uses faster and MISTY1, KASUMI and 
nare portable C. Camellia). 
Dmparison of operation modes. 
On eiphenext emor.. . On synchronisation er- 
m L.. 
An erroneous hit af- Affected block needs 
fects the entire current to be re-tmnsmitted IO 
block and the core- 
sponding hit of the next 
black. 
An emneaus bit af- Affected block needs 
fects the correspond- to he re-transmitted to 
ing hit of the current decrypt the next block. 
block and the entire 
next block. 
An emoneous hit af- Affected block does 
fects thecorresponding not need to he E- 
hit of the current block. 
Similar to OW. 
decrypt the next block. 
transmitted. 
Similar to OW. 
3.3. Implementation Sources 
To avoid reinventing the wheel, we try to use and im- 
prove as much existing source code as possible. We briefly 
compare a few source code libraries that we are aware of in 
Table 4. We have adapted most of our code from OpenSSL, 
and for the ciphers that do not have public implementation, 
we have adapted the reference source code from the origi- 
nal papers the ciphers are proposed in. Our sonrce code and 
benchmark results can be found at http: //wwwes. cs . 
utwente.nl/eyes/crypto-test.zip. 
3.4. Compilers 
For compilation, we are currently only using IAR Sys- 
tems’ MSP430 C Compiler V2.2OAN32 (www.iar. 
com). For debugging and profiling, we use IAR Sys- 
tems’ Embedded Workbench 3.2 with the integrated C- 
Table 4. Comparison of several cryptographic 
libraries. 
ion. (3) It is well-suited 
or benchmarking. nd Camellia). 
e.g. M l S T Y l ,  KkSUMl 
Ofan 11) Su~wns most if not Gimilarto Crvoto++. 
Spy Debugger and profiler plug-in. Another viable com- 
piler is the GNU C compiler in the MSPGCC toolchain 
(mspgcc . sf .net), however we are not using it due to 
the lack of profiling support by the toolchain. That said, we 
do not rule out the possibility of performing our benchmarks 
using the toolchain as it continues to mature in the future. 
Note that the chip supplier itself Texas Instruments offers 
only the Kickstart version of the toolchain we are using. 
In our benchmarks, we compare maximum size optimi- 
sation with maximum speed optimisation. The IAR com- 
piler supports 3 levels of optimisation in terms of size or 
speed: High, Medium and Low, as well as 4 kinds of trans- 
formations: common subexpression elimination (ELIM), 
loop unrolling (UNROLL), function inlining (INLINE) and 
code motion (MOTION). Table 5 lists the levels of opti- 
misation and kinds of transformations we use for each ci- 
pher. Furthermore, all code is compiled to use the hard- 
ware multiplier. In Table 5 and other tables henceforth, 
key setup modules, encryption modules, decryption mod- 
ules and lookup tables are labelled as skey, enc, dec 
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and tab respectively. For MISTY 1 and KASUMI, the IAR 
compiler has trouble applying MediumMigh sizelspeed op- 
timisation as well as code transformations on enc and dec, 
hence only Low optimisation is used. For all key setup 
algorithms, ELIM and MOTION help reduce the code size 
further than using size optimisation alone. ELIM hut not 
MOTION has the same effect on CBC, but not on CFB, OFB 
and CTR. 
skey, enc., dec' High, ELM. MO- 
TION 
High, ELIM, UN- 
ROLL, INLINE, 
High, ELIM High, ELIM, U N  
ROLL, INLINE, 
High, ELM, UN- 
CTR ROLL. N I N E .  
.key 
BC 
I MOTION 
*Except for MISTY1 and KASUMI, which use only Low optimisatian 
and no transformation Tor both size and speed. 
92 62 16.32 4 58 170 
64 100 92 62 62 148 
4. Results 
We have performed our measurements in standalone 
mode, i.e. without interaction with an OS. We have taken 
care in making the interface of the cipher implementations 
as uniform as possible, so that no difference in performance 
is a result of the difference in the interfaces. Our hench- 
mark parameters are memory and CPU cycles. Given i n  
Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 are the results in terms of these 
two parameters, followed immediately by our observation 
and analysis in Section 4.3. 
4.1. Memory 
We refer to two types of memory: (I) code memory, in 
the form of Flash memory and (2) data memory, in the form 
of RAM. The memory organisation of MSP430F149 is such 
that data memory ranges from address 0200h to OYFFh, 
whereas code memory ranges from 01 l00h to OFFFFh. The 
IAR compiler generates 3 types of segments for MSP430 
CODE, CONST and DATA. A typical policy is to put 
CODE and CONST segments in the code memory, while 
DATA segments in the data memory. Each segment type is 
further divided into the following sub-types: 
FB 
1. CODE: CODE (program code), CSTART and 
INTVEC; 
42 62 54 40 40 110 
R 4 4  64 56 42 42 I I2 
2. CONST DATA16AC, DATA16-C (constants includ- 
ing string literals), DATA16ID (initial values of static 
and global variables) and DIFUNCT; 
~~ , ~~~ ~~~~ 
CBC 64 102 94 64 66 150 
CFB 42 62 54 40 42 110 
OFB 42 62 54 40 42 110 
CTR 44 64 56 42 44 112 
3. DATA: CSTACK (the C runtime stack), DATAI6AN. 
DATA16J (initialised variables), DATA163, 
DATA 1 6 2  and HEAP. 
Of all the above segment sub-types, we use only the un- 
derlined ones. The memory usage of these segments can 
be read off the list files generated by the compiler, and the 
results are shown in Table 7 and 6. 
In Table 6, notice that Rijndael has two figures for the 
data memory of skey: 16 is for encryption key setup, 
whereas 32 is for decryption key setup. Other ciphers use 
only one key setup algorithm for both encryption and de- 
cryption. 
In Table 7, the code memory for each CBC module takes 
into account ( I )  the code memory for key setup, (2)  the 
code memory for barebone encryption and decryption, (3) 
the code memory for lookup tables, as well as (4) the code 
memory for CBC-specific parts. CFB, OFB and CTR do 
not use the decryption function 1281, hence the code mem- 
ory for each CFBIOFBICTR module is similarly calculated 
except that the code memory for decryption, and decryption 
key setup in Rijndael's case, are not included. Note that the 
storage for plaintext, ciphertext, cipher key as well as ex- 
panded key is not included in Table 6 nor Table 7. 
FB 
TR 
Table 6. Data memorv reauirements. 
3336 1274 12860 4972 5676 17068 
3414 1352 12938 5050 5754 17146 
~ F B  I 42 62 54 40 40 110 I 
I RC5 RC6 Rijndvel MlSTYl KASUMI Camellia 
k w  I 288 62 16.32 4 36 184 
Table 7. Code memory requirements. 
Si,? onrimisen. .. .~ .... ~~.~~ 
ode] RC5 RC6 Rijndvel MISTY1 KASUMI Camellia 
.RC I 1 7 6  2576 14716 7112 9702 19708 ~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
1324 12688 4222 5446 12382 
FB 836 1252 12616 4150 5374 12310 
R 986 1402 12766 4300 5524 12460 
Speed optimised 
ode1 RC5 RC6 Rijndael MlSTYl KASUMI Camellia 
6312 2878 15842 8492 10348 29206 
3416 1354 12940 5052 5756 17148 
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4.2. CPU Cycles 
The computational complexity of an algorithm translates 
directly to its energy consumption. Assuming the energy 
per CPU cycle is fixed (which is justified in the Appendix), 
then by measuring the number of CPU cycles executed per 
byte of plaintext processed, we get the amount of energy 
consumed per byte. For example MSP430F149 draws a 
nominal current of 420pA at 3V and at a clock frequency of 
lMHz in active mode 1301 -this means that the energy per 
instruction cycle (fur the pmcessor alone) is theoretically 
1.26 nJ. 
To evaluate the ciphers, we must determine the range of 
plaintext lengths that is of greatest interest to sensor net- 
works. Here is how we amve at the choice of 4 to 64 bytes: 
first we would like to see the effect of half-blocks on the 
ciphers' performance since we expect the ciphers to he less 
efficient with partial blocks, so we start with the half-block 
length of the 64-bit ciphers (RC5, MISTY 1, KASUMI), 
that is 4 bytes. We then look at some MAC protocols like 
Sensor-MAC or S-MAC 1331. In S-MAC, the control pack- 
ets are around IO bytes long, and the data packet header 
is 13 bytes. Meanwhile Pemg et al. 1241 suggest that data 
packets of 30 bytes long are realistic. Doubling this length 
(30 bytes) for the worst case scenario, we get 60 bytes, and 
rounding it off to a whole-block length, we get 64 bytes. 
Hence we think 4 to 64 bytes with an interval of 4 bytes is 
a reasonable range for our benchmarks. 
Figure la  shows our measurements for CBC encryption. 
CBC decryption consumes a slightly different number of 
CPU cycles, but the relative ordering between the various 
ciphers remains the same. Of particular interest is  that when 
size-optimised, MISTY1 is more efficient than when it is 
speed-optimised, and it actually outperforms size-optimised 
Rijndael when the plaintext is shorter than 8 bytes. At more 
than 8 bytes, Rijndael becomes more efficient, partly be- 
cause in that case it takes fewer invocations of the Rijndael 
encryption function than it takes the MISTY 1 encryption 
function. Figure Ib shows that speed-optimised MISTY1 is 
more efficient than speed-optimised Camellia, for plaintext 
lengths of below 8 bytes, and between 20 and 24 bytes. 
For CFB, OFB and CTR with the exception of RC5 and 
RC6, we found that the number of CPU cycles consumed 
per byte, y, can he approximated by 
where x is the plaintext length, B is the cipher's block 
length (both in bytes); C, C, 'and CB are constants. In 
Equation I ,  the first term C, accounts for the function call 
overhead, the second term xCb accounts for the overhead 
of organising x bytes into B-byte blocks, and the last term 
accounts for the actual enldecryption process and in C T R s  
I., . , .. ...'.~. ........... .~,~..*.. . ~...~.. ~, , '''.... ...., ~,~ ,,,,... . - ~ ~  .... 
10 20 30 4a 50 MI 
2 w '  
pidnten i m m  (bvesi 
Figure 1. CPU usage of CBC encryption when 
(a) size-optimised, and, (b) speed-optimised. 
case the increment of a counter. This approximation does 
not apply to CBC because with ciphertext stealing CBC in- 
volves more complicated computation. This approximation 
does not apply to RC5 and RC6 either because an RC5/RC6 
enldecryption executes a different number of rotations de- 
pending on the data and the key, resulting in a non-constant 
value for CB. Thus for RC5 and RC6, the following equa- 
tion is more appropriate: 
(2) 
where VB is a variable. Table 8 lists the values of C,S, Cb, 
CB (for Rijndael, MISTY I ,  KASUMI and Camellia) and 
V, (for RC5 and RC6) obtained through least squares fit- 
ting. The estimated values of VB are given in ranges. The 
standard error of each of the constants is less than 10-l'. 
Note that CFB, OFB and CTR consume exactly the same 
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number of CPU cycles for both encryption and decryption. 
ind CTR. 
Cipher 
Rijndael 
Camellia 
RC6 
MISTY1 
KASUMl 
RC5 
Rijndael 
Camellia 
RC6 
MlSTYl 
KASUMI 
RC5 
Rijndael 
Camellia 
RC6 
MlSTYl 
KASUMI 
RC5 
Tab1 
OFE 
Mode 
~ 
CFE 
__ 
OFB 
- 
C T R  
- 
! -
Cf 
94 
94 
94 
94 
94 
94 
82 
82 
82 
82 
82 
82 
90 
90 
90 
90 
90 
90 
8. Values of C,, Cb, CB (or V,) for CFB, 
ize 81804 96650 1745, 1057 2564 23211 
6769 
- 
OF 
4 
- 
51 
51 
51 
51 
51 
51 
27 
27 
27 
27 
27 
27 
33 
33 
33 
33 
33 
33 
- 
- 
- 
CB or 
3717 
11949 
17561- 
17671 
3171 
3849 
8941- 
8991 
3717 
I1949 
17561- 
17671 
3171 
3849 
8941- 
8991 
3774 
12006 
17618- 
17728 
3214 
3892 
8984- 
9034 
- 
- 
~ 
- 
S 
G 
- 
86 
86 
86 
86 
86 
86 
82 
82 
82 
82 
82 
82 
90 
90 
90 
- 
- 
90 
90 
90 
- 
d.r c 
- 
35 
35 
35 
35 
35 
35 
27 
27 
27 
27 
27 
27 
33 
33 
33 
33 
33 
33 
- 
- 
- 
nised 
CB or 
2613 
5885 
16201- 
16361 
3531 
4912 
4751- 
4861 
2613 
5885 
16201- 
16361 
3531 
4912 
4751- 
4861 
2662 
5934 
16250- 
16410 
3574 
4955 
4794- 
4904 
__ 
- 
- 
~ 
In Table 8, it can be easily seen that OFB is the fastest 
mode hoth when size- and speed- optimised. Although not 
apparent in Figure 1 and Table 8, CTR is more efficient than 
CBC as shown in Figure 2 using Rijndael as an example. 
All,in all, the speed comparison is OFB > CTR > CFB > 
CBC when size-optimised, but OFB > CFB > CTR > CBC 
when speed-optimiskd. Observe also that size optimisation 
only speeds up CBC and CFB, but not OFB and CTR. 
Apart from eddecryption, we are also interested in the 
efficiency of the key setup algorithms. Table 9 has the re- 
sults. Note again that encryption key setup and decryp- 
tion key setup consume different numbers of CPU cycles 
in Rijndael's case. 
", ", 
bDeedl 40556 93811 1313. 584 1296 15335 I 
Figure 2. 
4.3. Observation and Analysis 
First about the operation mode. A p m  from having the 
highest memory and energy efficiency, OFB has desirable 
fault-tolerance characteristics especially in an error-prone 
environment such as the wireless network, that is ( I )  an er- 
roneous ciphertext bit affects only the corresponding bit of 
the decrypted plaintext block, (2) the decryption of a cipher- 
text block is independent of the previous block (cf Table 3). 
However in the event that multiple blocks are lost, for ex- 
ample if  i blocks cl. ..., c. are lost, the computing cost of 
the (i + 1)-th plaintext block using OFB is i + 1 encryptions 
of the initialisation vector, which is higher than the corre- 
sponding cost using CTR, involving just 1 increment and 1 
encryption of the counter. 
Next we analyse Figure 1, Table 7, 6 and 8 cipher by 
cipher: 
RC5: The speed-optimised version is 2 times as fast as 
the size-optimised version, at a price of 50% more code size 
and 3 times as much data size (which is 14% of the available 
RAM in an EYES node). 
RC6: Nechvatal et al. [22] note that on the 280 proces- 
sor, the key setup of RC6 is very time-consuming, and it 
takes about 4 times as many cycles as encryption (of one 
block) does. Our measurements reveal that key setup takes 
at least 5 times as many cycles as CBC encryption (the least 
efficient mode) does. For eddecryption, there is no signif- 
icant difference between the size-optimised and the speed- 
optimised version in terms of memory and CPU cycles. 
Rijndael: Rijndael has a large S-box, eating up over 
l0KB of code memory, which is about the current sire of 
the EYES operating system [21]. Among our selection, 
Rijndael is the only cipher that has a separate key setup for 
decryption, and we note that this key setup is about 4 times 
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as slow as that for encryption. 
MISTY1: As mentioned, except for key setup, MISTY1 
is actually more efficient when size-optimised than when 
speed-optimised. The size-optimised version also provides 
17-19% savings in storage, with largely the same data mem- 
ory requirement. MISTYl requires only 4 bytes of data 
memory for key setup. 
KASUMI: Like MISTY 1, the size-optimised version of 
KASUMI is more efficient than the speed-optimised ver- 
sion. Although the key setup of KASUMI is linear [9 ] ,  it 
takes more than 2 times as long as that of MISTY1 which is 
non-linear. Compared with MISTY 1, KASUMI uses more 
memory and is less efficient. 
Camellia: Camellia has the largest code and data mem- 
ory requirement, but with speed optimisation, Camellia is 
only worse than Rijndael in efficiency. This observation co- 
incides with Granelli et al.’s conclusion that “Camellia is 
close to Rijndael” in performance [IO]. 
To conclude our observations, we now discuss the rank- 
ings of the ciphers in Table IO. 
v v 
Table 10. Ranking of ciphers*. 
EnlDecryption I Key setup 
ode m e m h t a  memiSDeed [D ata memdwed BrDanded 
v ey storag, 
* Subscript I means sizc-optimised, s means speed-aptimised 
In terms of eddecryption, RC5 scores high on (mean- 
ing ‘requires little’) code memory and data memory while 
low on speed. While RC6 excels in small code size, it is 
the slowest even after speed optimisation. Speed-optimised 
Rijndael offers the highest speed but has a large code size. 
Size-optimised MISTY1 is a solid performer in all cate- 
gories, only worse than RCS, RC6 in code size, and Rijn- 
dael, Camellia in speed. KASUMI is always slightly be- 
hind MISTY l in all categories. Speed-optimised Camellia 
has decent performance but the largest code size and RAM 
footprint. 
In terms of key setup, RCS tends to rank near the bottom 
except in the storage requirement of expanded keys. RC6 
is only better than RCS in terms of data memory require- 
ment. Rijndael requires little data memory but is slower 
tban MISTY1 and KASUMI. Rijndael also requires a lot of 
storage for expanded keys, hut in a degree not worse than 
Camellia. MISTY 1 is the winner, with KASUMI lagging 
slightly behind in all categories. Camellia requires a lot of 
data memory and storage for expanded keys, although it is 
better than RCS and RC6 in energy efficiency. Note that 
expanded keys can he stored in the code or data memory. 
5. Conclusion 
First on the suitable operation mode to use. Although 
OFB is the most storage- and energy-efficient mode, in 
cases where multiple blocks are lost, it is less efficient 
than CTR for regaining synchronisation. Although speed- 
optimised CFB is more efficient than CTR, it requires lost 
blocks to be re-transmitted. CBC not only requires lost 
blocks to he re-transmitted, but also requires a lot of code, 
data memory and CPU cycles. CBC is popular in the wired 
world because unlike other modes, the initialisation vector 
can be re-used. Our conclusion is that OFB should be used 
in static networks while CTR in dynamic networks, assum- 
ing static networks are less prone to packet loss. Parallel to 
our conclusion, Penig et al. have used the CTR mode in 
their SPINS testhed [24]. 
On the suitable cipher to use, we will reach our verdict 
by first ruling out the unlikely candidates. First we would 
like to emphasise that MSP430F149 is  one of the most high- 
end in the Texas Instrument’s MSP430 series. In other 
words, a total code memory of S9.7KB and data memory 
of 2KB is a hard limit in the MSP430 family of processors. 
For this reason, we first rule out Camellia which occupies 
US of the total code memory even after size optimisation, 
even though it has good energy-efficiency for eddecryption 
when speed-optimised. The next to be  ruled out are RCS 
and RC6, which have poor energy efficiency and key agility 
(the ability to change keys quickly and with a minimum 
amount of resources). KASUMI lags behind MISTY 1 in 
all categories, so we should consider MISTY1 instead of 
KASUMI. 
Finally the verdict: for maximum energy-efficiency, we 
recommend speed-optimised Rijndael; whereas for truly 
constrained environments, we recommend size-optimised 
MISTYI. Although MISTYl is slower than Rijndael in 
ddecryption, MISTY 1 has higher key agility and requires 
less memory (e.g. MISTYl’s code size is 1/3 of Rijndael’s). 
One other drawback apart from eddeclyption speed is that 
MISTY 1 is believed to be less secure than Rijndael and it 
only caters for one key length, but we foresee that there are 
applications that do not require a security level higher than 
MISTY 1 can provide, such as environmental sensing. 
Reviewing some of the proposals in the literature so far, 
we see that we are disagreeing with Pemg et al. [24] about 
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using RC5, and with Slijepcevic et al. [291 about using RC6. 
Another aspect to consider is that most embedded proces- 
sors do not support the variable-bit rotation instruction like 
ROL of the Intel architecture [13] which greatly improves 
the performance o f  RC5. Slijepcevic e t  al. suggest varying 
the number of rounds to achieve different levels of security 
with RC6, but increasing the number of rounds beyond the 
nominal value to increase the level of security is a specu- 
lative approach compared with increasing the key length. 
That is, using longer keys for higher security is a more ap- 
propriate approach. One non-technical reason against the 
use of RC6 is that the cipher is patented and not myalty- 
free. 
In conclusion, we have presented a detailed benchmark 
for one of the most important cryptographic primitives for 
WSNs, i.e. block ciphers. Taking into account the security 
properties, storage- and energy-efficiency of a set of candi- 
dates, we have anived at a systematically justifiable selec- 
tion of block ciphers and operation modes. 
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Appendix: Per-Cycle Energy Consumption 
Different instructions may take different numbers of 
clock cycles, resulting in different energy consumption per 
instruction. Even different instructions with the same num- 
her of clock cycles may consume different amounts of en- 
ergy, because of the nature of the instruction itself, for ex- 
ample an instruction that accesses the memory would natu- 
rally consume more energy than an instruction that accesses 
the registers. We will however show that the energy con- 
sumed per cycle does not vary much from instruction to in- 
struction. 
MethodologV To achieve this, we should ideally measure 
the energy consumed by each cycle of different instructions. 
However measuring such energy is difficult without instru- 
menting the chip, so we measure the current instead. If we 
fix the voltage V ,  by measuring the current I ,  we get the 
power P. If a cycle is t ,  seconds long, and an instruction 
consists of c cycles, let e l ,  ..., e, be the energy consumed 
by each cycle, then 
where E ~ e +.-.+e,  is the average energy consumed per 
cycle. Since V and t, are fixed, by measuring I ,  we are in 
fact measuring A. There is a possibility that e,  <i E and 
e, >> E for some i # j and yet E does not V ~ I Y  much 
from instruction to instruction, meaning that even if A is 
constant, we cannot claim that “energy per cycle” is con- 
stant. However this is not a problem, because every instruc- 
tion is always executed as a whole, with the energy-lean cy- 
cle(s) compensating the energy-consuming cycle(s). Worth 
mentioning is that this method is consistent with Chien and 
Wen’s [ 5 ] .  
The current is measured when an instruction xxx is ex- 
ecuted in an infinite loop: 
Mainloop xxx <some randomised operandss 
xxx cother randomised operandss 
. . .  100 times 
jmp Mainloop 
Note that in the above template, one j m p  instruction after 
every 100 times of the measured instruction does not affect 
the measurement much, moreover we can measure the cur- 
rent of jmp without the influence, of other instructions: 
Mainloop jmp Label2 
Label2 jmp Mainloop 
Whenever immediate constant operands, offsets, data are 
involved, they are randomly generated. In fact, all the test 
programs are generated by a Per1 script. 
Since there are 7 addressing modes [31], an instruction 
like mov. w can he used in at least I modes depending on 
the type of its operands, e.g. ‘mov. w R 1 2 ,  2 ( R 1 4 )  ’, 
‘mov. w @ R 1 2 + ,  R14’ etc. Fortunately not all modes of 
the same instruction are generated by the compiler. We only 
test those modes of the instruction generated by the com- 
piler. To find these in-use modes, we have written a Per1 
script to parse thc assembler code of our block cipher algo- 
rithms (generated by the compiler). For example, the only 
mode used for the instruction and. b is ‘and. b #C , Rn’, 
and we only measure this particular mode of and. b (where 
‘#C’ stands for an immediate constant, and ‘Rn’ stands for 
a register). 
Our test programs are generally divided into 3 parts: 
( I )  the program, (2)  the source data, and (3) the des- 
tination data. For example, while the instruction 
‘mov. w @R12, 2 ( R 1 4 )  ’ itself resides in the program 
area, ‘@R12’ points to a word in the source data area, 
whereas ‘2 ( R 1 4 )  ’ points to a word in the destination data 
area. Referring to Table 11, IM refers to the current when 
the program, source data and destination data are loaded 
in the RAM; whereas IFlash refers to the current when the 
program and the source data are loaded in the Flash but the 
destination data in the RAM. The destination data is always 
loaded in the RAM because they are meant to he ovenvrit- 
ten byte-by-byte, while Hash can only he erased one sector 
at a time. We do not consider cache because there is none 
in the processor. Logically Iun  is lower than since 
accessing the RAM is cheaper, however we will show that 
the difference is only about 6% of the mean. 
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Instead of measuring the current consumed by the pro- 
cessor alone, we have measured the current consumed by 
the entire EYES sensor node. This is acceptable because 
the measured instructions do not invoke functions on the 
peripheral circuits, and assuming the leakage current in the 
peripheral circuits stays constant independent of the mea- 
sured instructions. 
Results There are no entries in Table 11 for ‘ret’ ,  
‘p0p.b Rn’ and ‘p0p.w Rn’. Instead, ‘ re t ’  is mea- 
sured along with ‘call #L’ or ‘call Rn’; ‘pop. b Rn’ 
along with ‘push. b Rn’; and ‘pop. w R n ’  along with 
‘push.w #C’, ’push.w Rn’ or ‘push.w X(Rn)’. 
This is fair because in real-world applications, a pop is al- 
ways associated with a push, so is a r e t  associated with a 
c a l l .  
The average current is 2.93mA, with a standard devi- 
ation of 0.05. From the table, we can see that the most 
energy-consuming instructions are ‘mov. b @Rn+ , Rn’ 
and ‘xor . b @Rn+ , Rn’, consuming a current of 3.03mA 
(when the program and the source data are loaded in 
the Flash), whereas ‘bis . w R n ,  Rn’, ‘mov . b Rn, Rn’, 
‘rn0v.w Rn,Rn’, the rotation instructions, ‘swpb Rn’  
and ‘sxt Rn’  are the cheapest, consuming a current of 
2.85mA (when everything is loaded in the RAM). While 
it is easy to appreciate why the latter instructions elicit 
the least current, it is interesting to leam that the instruc- 
tion mode of ‘@RA+, Rn’ draws a higher current than 
‘@Rn+,X(Rn)’ (although this does not mean that the 
‘@RIP+, Rn’ over 2 cycles, consumes more energy than 
‘@RIP+, x (Rn) ’ over 5 cycles). 
All in all, the difference between the largest and the 
smallest current is only 6% of the mean, and we conclude 
that Z is more or less consistent, or in other words it is safe 
to assume that “energy per cycle” is more or less consistent 
for our particular hardware platform. 
Table 11. Measured currents IFlash and In*” for 
each instruction in mA (V=2.994V, tC=0.22ps). 
add.b #c.Rn 
add.b Rn,Rn 
add.w UC,Rn 
add.w #C,XIRnl 
add.u Rn.Rn 
addc.w uc.m 
addc.w #C,xlRnl 
addc.w XlRnl .Rn 
addc.w XlRnl ,XlRn) 
and.b UC.Rn 
and.w #C,Rn 
and.u UC.XIRn) 
and.u ORn.Rn 
and.w X(Rn1 ,Rn 
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1 
2 
5 
I 
I 
5 
3 
6 
I 
I 
5 
2 
5 
1Fb.b  
2.98 
2.95 
2.99 
2.99 
2.96 
2.99 
2.97 
2.99 
2.99 
2.99 
2.99 
2.97 
2.99 
3.w 
Jw 
2.89 
2.87 
2.91 
2.94 
2.87 
2.90 
2.90 
2.90 
2.90 
2.89 
2.90 
2.90 
2.90 
2.90 
bis.w BRn,Rn 
bis.w Rn,Rn 
bis.w X(Rn1 .Rn 
bit.b UC.X(Rnl 
bit.w #C.Rn 
bit.” #C.X(Rnl 
br UL 
call #L 
call Rn 
ClrC 
cmp.w #C.Rn 
cmp.w #C.XIRnl 
CmD.w k . R n  
r1a.b Rn 
r1a.w Rn 
r1c.b Rn 
r1c.w Rn 
rra.b Rn 
rra.w Rn 
IIC. b Rn 
rrc . w Rn 
sub.b Rn.Rn 
sub.w #C.Rn 
sub.w sRn.Rn 
8ub.w Rn,Rn 
sub.w XlRn),Rn 
SUbC.b UC.Rn 
subc.b ~ n , ~ n  
subc.w Rn,Rn 
subc.w XlRn).Rn 
s w b  Rn 
sxt Rn 
xor.b #c.nn 
x01.b mRn.Rn 
x0r.b sRn.XIRn) 
x0r.b Rn,Rn 
x0r.b Rn,XIRnl 
x0r.b X(Rn1.R” 
x0r.b XIRnl .X(Rnl 
X0r.Y #C.Rn 
x0r.Y UC.XlRn) 
x0r.w wRn.Rn 
x0r.W Rn,Rn 
x0r.w Rn,XiRnl 
X 0 r . W  XIRn),Rn 
X0T.b sRn+.Rn 
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